UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1996/92
8 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 1044 (1996) of 31 January 1996, in which the Security Council requested me, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to seek the cooperation of the Government of the Sudan in the implementation of the resolution and to report to the Council within sixty days.

I believe that the mandate entrusted to me by the Security Council would be carried out most effectively if I were to send a Special Envoy to the area to conduct the requisite consultations and gather relevant information. I have chosen for this task my Special Adviser, Under-Secretary-General Chinmaya Gharekhan, whom I have asked to travel to Addis Ababa and Khartoum as soon as the necessary arrangements have been made.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

96-03005 (E) 080296 090296

UNITED NATIONS **S**

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S/1996/93
8 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 8 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 6 February 1996 (S/1996/92) concerning your decision to send a Special Envoy to Addis Ababa and Khartoum has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They welcome and support the decision contained in your letter.

(Signed) Madeleine Korbel ALBRIGHT
President of the Security Council

96-03011 (E) 080296 090296

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S/1996/94
8 February 1996

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LETTER DATED 6 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 1 February 1996 (S/1996/76) in which you inform me that the members of the Security Council concur in principle with my recommendation that the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) become an independent mission which will have basically the same mandate, strength and composition of forces.

I appreciate this decision in principle by the Security Council. The financial and administrative implications regarding the establishment of UNPREDEP as an independent mission have in general terms been outlined in paragraphs 21 to 23 of my report of 29 January 1996 (S/1996/65).

These implications should be seen in the context of the necessary restructuring of the United Nations presence in the former Yugoslavia as a result of the expiration of the mandates of UNCRO, UNPROFOR and UNPF-HQ and the establishment of two new missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1035 (1995) and 1037 (1996). I am submitting separately a comprehensive report on these arrangements under the document symbol S/1996/83.

In the past, with regard to UNPREDEP, essential administrative, logistic and communications services were centrally provided as theatre assets by UNPF-HQ from within the budget of that headquarters and within the troop ceilings approved by the Security Council. With the termination of UNPF-HQ, these services need to be incorporated in the UNPREDEP budget and into that mission's authorized strength. As pointed out in paragraph 22 of my report S/1996/65, UNPREDEP's strength will have to be increased by 50 military personnel in order to provide for a continued engineering capability in support of its operations.

Previously, overall operational authority over the military components of the three operations in former Yugoslavia, including UNPREDEP, was exercised on my behalf through the Theatre Force Commander of UNPF-HQ. This arrangement has come to an end on 31 January 1996. Therefore, I will shortly appoint a Force Commander of UNPREDEP who will have authority over the military units and personnel of the force. This will require making the appropriate provision in the staffing table of that mission.

I should like to emphasize that these arrangements have in the past largely been covered in the budget of UNPF-HQ. Thus, the financial implications essentially represent a reallocation of resources previously provided for in the UNPF budget. As pointed out in my report, I intend to submit to the relevant United Nations bodies concrete proposals on the financial and administrative requirements of the proposed change in the status of UNPREDEP. These proposals will be submitted in conjunction with the financial and administrative arrangements for the liquidation of UNCRO, UNPROFOR and UNPF-HQ as well as for the new missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia in order to enable the pertinent bodies of the General Assembly to assess the recommendations in a consolidated manner.

In light of the above and given the concurrence in principle by the Security Council to my recommendation that UNPREDEP become an independent mission, I would appreciate the Council's approval of the proposed increase of the authorized strength of UNPREDEP by 50 military personnel and of the appointment of a Force Commander of UNPREDEP. A statement outlining the financial implications for the adjustments required for UNPREDEP as an independent mission is issued as an annex to this letter.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Annex

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

1. As I indicated in paragraph 23 of my report to the Security Council dated 29 January 1996 (S/1996/65), it is my intention to revert to the relevant United Nations bodies at a later date with concrete proposals on the financial and administrative requirements of the proposed change in the status of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The following cost estimates are provided for the information of the Security Council.

2. The estimated cost associated with the change in status of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to become an independent mission reporting directly to the United Nations headquarters in New York for a six-month period would be $29 million. This estimate provides for 1,050 contingent personnel, 35 military observers, 26 civilian police, 73 international civilian staff and 127 locally recruited staff.

3. A breakdown of the estimated financial requirements, by main categories of expenditure, is attached for information purposes. Should the Security Council concur with my recommendation that UNPREDEP become an independent mission, it would be my recommendation to the General Assembly that the costs relating thereto should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessments to be levied on Member States be credited to a Special Account to be established for this purpose.

Cost estimate for the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)

(Thousands of United States dollars)

		Initial six months
1.	Military personnel costs	12 800
2.	Civilian personnel costs	5 400
3.	Premises/accommodation	1 400
4.	Infrastructure repairs	500
5.	Transport operations	2 100
6.	Air operations	800
7.	Naval operations	-
8.	Communications	1 500
9.	Other equipment	500
10.	Supplies and services	1 500
11.	Election-related supplies and services	-
12.	Public information programmes	100
13.	Training programmes	-
14.	Mine-clearing programmes	-
15.	Assistance for disarmament	-
16.	Air and surface freight	1 300
17.	Integrated Management Information System	-
18.	Support account for peace-keeping operations	400
19.	Staff assessment	700
	Total	29 000

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9 February 1996

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LETTER DATED 9 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TAJIKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan on 8 February 1996 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Rashid ALIMOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-03135 (E) 090296 090296 120296

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Annex

[Original: Russian]

Statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tajikistan on 8 February 1996

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan is authorized to state that despite all the efforts by the leadership of the Republic of Tajikistan to resolve the issues in the inter-Tajik conflict, the continuation of the uninterrupted round of inter-Tajik talks in Ashgabat, the strict observation by the Government of the terms of the truce in accordance with the requirements of the Tehran Agreement on a Temporary Cease-fire and the Cessation of Other Hostile Acts on the Tajik-Afghan Border and within the Country, the situation in the Pamir regions of the Republic of Tajikistan remains tense as a result of the illegal actions of the opposition.

Thus, according to a report from the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Tajikistan, starting on 28 January 1996 armed formations of the opposition field commander Zieev Mirzo stepped up military operations in the Tavildara region, for the purpose of establishing full control there. In their operations, the opposition guerrillas are committing the most flagrant violations of the Geneva Convention in their treatment of prisoners of war. Hiding behind a "living shield" of members of the Government forces, they are continuing attacks which are compelling the command of the armed forces of the Republic of Tajikistan to abandon the positions occupied by it in order to avoid unjustified losses of life among military personnel and the civilian population. Acting in this barbaric manner, the armed formations of the opposition have occupied a number of inhabited locations.

Next, the opposition leadership is attempting to influence the lawful Government of the Republic of Tajikistan through the use of force, in the belief that by such actions it will be able to compel it to make political concessions.

The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan once again states its position in the talks, which is based on strict compliance with the provisions of the documents previously signed by both sides, and reaffirms that its previous position regarding the solution of the inter-Tajik conflict exclusively by peaceful means remains unchanged.

The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan strongly condemns the terrorist methods being employed by the enemies of the Tajik people, and states in all responsibility that if the escalation of tension in the above-mentioned regions continues, it will take appropriate measures to ensure the stabilization of the situation in the country and compliance with international norms relating to human rights.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan appeals to the United Nations and to the observer countries at the inter-Tajik talks to assess the facts stated above in the appropriate light, to bring to the attention of the opposition leadership the unacceptability of seeking to influence the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan through the use of force, and to oblige it to halt the illegal actions by its formations.